A HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENT SPECIFICATION FOR LOW-COST, DISTRIBUTED UBIQUITOUS SYSTEMS by Zuo, Yanjun
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICIS 2010 Proceedings International Conference on Information Systems(ICIS)
2010
A HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR SECURITY




University of North Dakota, yanjun.zuo@und.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2010_submissions
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ICIS 2010 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Zuo, Yanjun, "A HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENT SPECIFICATION FOR LOW-COST,
DISTRIBUTED UBIQUITOUS SYSTEMS" (2010). ICIS 2010 Proceedings. 9.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2010_submissions/9
 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 1 
A HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENT 
SPECIFICATION FOR LOW-COST, DISTRIBUTED 
UBIQUITOUS SYSTEMS1 
Completed Research Paper 
Yanjun Zuo 
University of North Dakota 




The class of low-cost, distributed ubiquitous systems represents a computing mode where a system 
has small, inexpensive networked processing devices, distributed at all scales throughout business 
activities and everyday life. The unique features of such a class of ubiquitous systems make the 
security analysis different from that for the centralized computing paradigms. This paper presents 
a holistic approach for security requirement analysis for low cost, distributed ubiquitous systems.  
Rigorous security analysis needs both quantitative and qualitative approaches to produce the 
holistic view and the robust data regarding the security features that a system must have in order 
to meet users’ security expectations. Our framework can assist system administrators to specify 
key security properties for a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system and to define the specific 
security requirements for such a system. We applied Bayesian network and stochastic process 
algebra to incorporate probabilistic analysis to the framework. 
 
Keywords:  IS security, ubiquitous technology, requirement analysis, research framework, IT risk 
management 
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Introduction 
Ubiquitous computing, also described as pervasive computing, represents a post-desktop model of human-computer 
interaction in which information processes have been thoroughly integrated into everyday objects and daily business 
activities (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubiquitous_computing). Ubiquitous computing has been used in a wide 
range of areas.  There is recognition that in many ways we are already living in a ubiquitous computing world. For 
example, a domestic ubiquitous computing environment might interconnect lighting and environmental controls 
with personal biometric monitors woven into clothing so that illumination and heating conditions in a room might be 
continuously and imperceptibly modulated.  Another common scenario posits refrigerators "aware" of their suitably-
tagged contents, able to both plan a variety of menus from the food actually on hand and warn users of stale or 
spoiled food. 
The term ubiquitous computing is generic and includes a set of techniques. In this paper, we focus on a class of low-
cost, distributed ubiquitous systems, which plays important roles in the current and future pervasive computing.  A 
system in this class has the following characteristics: (1) it has a large set of small, inexpensive, networked 
processing devices. Those devices have limited computation and storage capabilities and use wireless means to 
communicate with their peers or with other more powerful interrogating devices; (2) it is highly decentralized with 
the components distributed in a large scope; and (3) it focuses on collecting information through the device nodes to 
support higher-level applications. 
The most important low-cost, distributed ubiquitous systems include wireless sensor networks (WSNs) (Akyildiz, 
2002), radio frequency identification (RFID) (Karygiannis, et al. 2007) and mobile ad hoc networks (Toh, 2002).  
They represent the most widely used ubiquitous applications in business and many personal activities.  A WSN 
consists of a large number of sensor nodes and are able to collect and disseminate data in areas where ordinary 
networks are unsuitable for environmental and/or strategic reasons (Zia, 2008). WSNs have been used in many 
applications such as in-building energy usage monitoring; military and civilian surveillance; natural habitats 
monitoring; and data gathering in instrumented learning (to name a few).  An ad hoc network is a self-configuring 
network of mobile devices connected by wireless links.  Such a network does not rely on a preexisting 
infrastructure.  Instead, each node forwards traffics unrelated to its own use, and therefore becomes a router.   The 
decentralized nature of ad hoc networks makes them suitable for a variety of applications where central nodes can’t 
be relied on. Applications include emergency situations like natural disasters or military conflicts 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireless_ad_hoc_networks). An RFID system consists of a set of low-cost tags 
(passive or active), each of which is physically attached to an item with a unique identification.  An RFID reader is a 
device capable of communicating with an RFID tag.  RFID has been used for automatic item identification and data 
collection.  RFID enabled systems have been applied in various areas including supply chain, military, healthcare, 
and crisis management, just to name a few.  The US Department of Defense was requiring its 60,000 suppliers to tag 
items with RFID. Major retailer chains such as Wal-Mart and Target have mandated that all suppliers introduce 
RFID. 
Although ubiquitous computing holds the promise of enhancing human life quality and business productivity, it also 
raises great security challenges. The security and privacy issues are considered as the largest barriers for the 
proliferation of ubiquitous applications.  For instance, since most ubiquitous devices rely on wireless 
communications to connect to each other and with the backend supporting systems, this opens various opportunities 
for an attacker to eavesdrop, intercept, modify, or replay the messages transferred in the wireless channels and to 
jam and interfere with the wireless communications. In addition, since many ubiquitous systems have no fixed 
network structure and the ubiquitous devices tend to be unattended, the attacker could physically capture those 
devices. By reverse engineering or other similar techniques, the sensitive data stored in those devices could be 
retrieved, and consequently those victim-devices are compromised. 
There are also a great deal of privacy issues in ubiquitous computing, which must be addressed by deploying 
effective security mechanisms together with legal regulations and organizational policies. Imagine, for example, that 
a system allows an unattended person to view the video of a conference as captured by camera and RFID readers.  In 
an RFID-enabled inventory system, imagine that a competitor-sponsored attacker queries logistic and commercial 
data about an organization’s inventory and strategic operation plans. Many ubiquitous applications make 
information much easier to collect and access than ever before. There must be effective security mechanisms to 
ensure that sensitive data is only available to the right user and at the right time. Therefore, it is critical to define 
 Zuo / A Holistic Approach for Security Requirements Specification 
  
 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 3 
appropriate security requirements for those systems so that actions can be taken based on those requirements to 
ensure that they can meet the desired security level. 
Security in ubiquitous computing is challenging, however, due to several reasons.  First of all, a low-cost, distributed 
ubiquitous system has a great deal of components deployed in a large scope possibly with a high level of mobility. 
This makes the system monitoring and access control difficult. Secondly, many ubiquitous devices (e.g., RFID tags 
and WSN sensors) have limited physical protection. They could be physically attacked and controlled by 
adversaries. Thirdly, some ubiquitous devices (e.g., low-cost RFID tags and ad hoc nodes) have limited resources 
(e.g., memory storage and computational power) for security.  Many standard security mechanisms cannot be 
implemented on those devices.  All those factors make securing a ubiquitous system a challenging task. 
In this paper, we present a holistic approach for security requirement analysis for the class of low-cost, distributed 
ubiquitous systems as mentioned earlier. Rigorous security requirement analysis needs both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to produce the holistic view and the robust data regarding the security features that a system 
must have in order to meet users’ expectations.  Our framework provides a systematic security requirement analysis 
for such class of ubiquitous systems with three major components: (1) qualitative identification of security 
properties that the system must have; (2) quantitative measurement of the compromise rate(s) of the critical system 
components based on a security requirement specification; and (3) simulative analysis of the security level of the 
system.  The framework helps the system administrators answer the following types of questions: (a) how to 
systematically identify the security properties essential to lost-cost, distributed ubiquitous systems; (b) to which 
degrees those security properties must be satisfied by such a system in order for it to be considered with the required 
security level; and (c) how to determine the security level of the system and whether the system meets users’ 
security criteria? 
Our quantitative analysis and simulation model are particularly suitable for the class of low-cost, distributed 
ubiquitous systems for the following reasons:  
(1) Given the low-cost and high level of distribution of the components in such a system and the insecure 
wireless communications among those components, compromises or failures of some nodes are considered common.  
Therefore, a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system must have a certain level of repair ability to recover any 
compromised nodes as soon as possible. Our framework models the compromise and recovery of some system 
components and analyzes their dynamic effects on the overall system security given a security requirement 
specification for the system.  This is particularly suitable for a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system and different 
from those security analysis methods developed for centralized computing paradigms;  
(2) Given the security challenges that a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system may face and the 
computational constrictions of the system components, the system as a whole must meet users’ security 
requirements even though some individual components could be compromised.  Our framework applies a “bottom-
up” approach – we study how the integrated effects of component security affect the overall system security. A 
holistic approach is proposed to help users specify the security requirements for individual components in order to 
ensure that the system as a whole satisfies the users’ security criteria;  
(3) Since low-cost ubiquitous devices are vulnerable to various attacks and they tend to be unattended in 
many operational environments, the security status of those devices is often uncertain.  Given various factors that 
could affect the system components’ security features, probabilistic reasoning of the security requirements for the 
system and their components is both necessary and beneficial.  Our framework applies a probabilistic model to study 
how the security features of a critical system component determine the rate at which the component could be 
compromised and how likely the system will meet users’ security criteria given those components’ security status. 
Although we use an RFID system as a running example throughout the paper to illustrate how to apply our 
framework, the methodologies and methods presented in this paper can be applied to any low-cost, distributed 
ubiquitous system.  As we mentioned earlier, such class of ubiquitous systems is featured with a large set of small, 
inexpensive networked components which are highly distributed and may be vulnerable to various attacks.  For 
those systems, although some components could be compromised, the system as a whole must still provide useful 
services.  We develop a framework for security requirement specifications so that the system can meet users’ 
security criteria. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss related work.  In the following section, we describe 
our framework in detail. We first discuss security properties identification for a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous 
system, and then present security requirement quantification. We also summarize the framework and show how the 
proposed components are integrated.  Finally, we conclude our paper. 
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Related Work 
We discuss two major streams of work closely related to our research. 
Security Requirement Engineering Security requirement analysis has attracted many studies from the research 
community. Threat modeling as a basis of security requirement is discussed by Myagmar (Myagmar, et al. 2006). 
The authors present an approach to systematic threat modeling for complex systems. They also discuss the concept 
of risk management.  A goal-oriented approach is proposed by Oladimeji (Oladimeji, et al. 2006) to security threat 
modeling and analysis by using visual model elements. The authors introduce the notions of negative soft-goals for 
representing threats and inverse contributions for evaluating design alternatives. An analysis procedure is provided 
as a guide to context-sensitive selection of countermeasures. Mead (Mead, 2003) describes the current state of 
requirement engineering for survivable systems. The requirements for survivability strategies are enumerated as 
resistance, recognition and recovery. 
In the literature, however, there is little work on systematic reasoning and specification of the security requirements 
for a ubiquitous system.  Most of the existing works consider a centralized computing paradigm and model the 
system as a whole to transit from one state to another under different attack scenarios. Those approaches may not be 
suitable for a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system with a set of small, inexpensive networked devices vulnerable 
to various attacks. Our framework is proposed specifically for this class of ubiquitous systems and considers the 
impact of the component security features on the overall security level of the system.  It assists system 
administrators to enumerate security requirements for such a ubiquitous system in a systematic way. The security 
level of the system is quantified given a security requirement specification (i.e., a set of detailed security 
requirements). The administrators can then determine if the proposed security requirements can ensure that the 
system satisfies the users’ security expectations.  Various what-if types of questions can be answered to allow a set 
of more flexible and realistic security requirements for a ubiquitous system. The existing works do not sufficiently 
address those issues. 
In terms of threat modeling, our work differs from the existing studies in twofold.  First, our work extends the 
existing threat models with mapping risks to specific security requirements for a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous 
system. We present the approach and structure for a systematic security requirement mapping.  Secondly, it 
incorporates probabilistic reasoning to quantify the security requirements. While other threat modeling and security 
requirement analysis studies mainly focus on qualitative analysis, our work also provides quantitative analysis and 
simulations to specify the measurable and verifiable security requirements for a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous 
system. 
Bayesian Network Applications   Bayesian network has been applied to various applications, where evidence and 
cause-effect relationships can be used to predict probabilistic unknown values of variables of interest.  Several 
Bayesian network-based models in security have been proposed in the literature.  We only discuss a few here. Mehdi 
(Mehdi, et al. 2007) propose a new approach of an anomaly Intrusion detection system (IDS). It consists of building 
a reference behavior model and the use of a Bayesian classification procedure associated to unsupervised learning 
algorithm to evaluate the deviation between current and reference behavior. Continuous re-estimation of model 
parameters allows for real time operation.  Abouzakhar (Abouzakhar, et al. 2003) develop a probabilistic approach 
using Bayesian network to detect distributed network attacks as early as possible. Their approach shows how a 
Bayesian network probabilistically detects communication network attacks. Herath (Herath, et al. 2008) develop a 
model for information security investments using Bayesian inferences for valuation and post-auditing. Their work 
uses Bayesian statistics to model learning options and post-auditing of sequential real options, an idea that can be 
applied to a variety of other types of sequential investment problems. Sebyala (Sebala, et al. 2002) present the 
application of Bayesian technology in the development of an anomaly detection system for proxylets (third party 
executable codes). Their model can be incorporated into an intrusion detection system that will provide runtime 
security to ensure that active platform integrity is maintained while running third party executable codes. 
In this paper, we also applied Bayesian network to security requirement analysis; but our work has different goals 
from the above frameworks.  We use Bayesian network to represent the cause-effect relationships between various 
factors that affect the compromise rate of critical system components of a ubiquitous system.  Based on those 
relationships and possibly user input evidence, systems administrators can estimate the mean probabilistic 
compromise rate of those critical components. This quantification is important to determine the overall system 
security level given other factors such as system recovery and adversary capability. 
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The Framework 
There are two major phases of activities in our framework of security requirement analysis for a low-cost, 
distributed ubiquitous system (as shown in Figure 1): phase one – system security property identification; and phase 
two - security requirement quantification.  The first phase provides a qualitative view of security requirements for a 
ubiquitous system in terms of security properties that the system (and its major components) should have in order to 
be considered secure.  In order to systematically identify the important security properties of a system, it is 
necessary to formally characterize the system, pinpoint its critical components and major access points, and specify 
the security threats to the system and the critical components.  The second phase is an extension of the first. It 
quantitatively measures how the system security features of the proposed security requirement specification 
determine the security level of the system.  This phase provides quantification that indicates whether the proposed 
security requirements will result in a level of security of the system that meets users’ criteria.  This analysis helps 
system administrators define and evaluate a security requirement specification for a ubiquitous system.  From the 
perspective of system engineering, analyzing security requirements is the important first step in security 







Figure 1: The Two Phases of the Framework and the Tools and Methodologies Used in Each Phase 
Identifying Security Properties 
In this section, we present the methodologies and approaches to identify the security properties that a lost-cost, 
distributed ubiquitous system must have in order for it to be considered secure.  This phase provides a qualitative 
analysis for further security requirement quantification. The goal is to identify which kinds of security features are 
essential for the system and its major components. 
The term security property refers to a system characteristic which is essential to the security of the system.  Some 
examples of security properties of such a ubiquitous system include: (1) strong authentication and authorization 
abilities of its critical components; (2) the robustness of the services that those components provide and the abilities 
of the components to tolerate system faults (due to malicious attacks or system failures); and (3) the physical 
security of the components themselves. For each security property, there is a degree of measurement given a 
particular system: to which level that the system satisfies that security property. This satisfaction level is determined 
by the security requirements for that system.  Therefore, the security requirements proposed for a system can be 
represented in terms of a set of key system security properties.   For instance, we can specify the security 
requirements for a ubiquitous system as follows: (1) the critical components of the system must have a high level of 
authentication and authorization capability in order for them to identify other legitimate system components; (2) the 
system’s critical components must be robust to internal and external faults caused by either malicious attacks or 
system failures; (3) the critical components must have at least a medium level of physical security. 
From the perspective of security, it is always desired that a system has a high level of satisfaction for every security 
property.  However, due to cost constraints in system development and security technical challenges, it is often 
 Phase 1: Security Property Identification (focused on qualitative analysis) 
      Step 1: Threat modeling (system characterization, threat modeling and attack trees) 
      Step 2: Security property specification (security property mapping and security requirement specification) 
 Phase 2: Security Requirement Quantification (focused on quantitative analysis) 
      Step 1: Quantifying how security features of a ubiquitous system based on a proposed security requirement 
                  specification probabilistically determine the compromise rate of critical system components given a 
                  certain level of adversary capability  (Bayesian security analysis network model)  
     Step 2:  Measuring the system’s security level given the compromise rate of its critical components and the 
                  system recovery capability to determine if the security requirements as specified in the security 
                  requirement specification can ensure that the system satisfies the user’s security expectations. 
                  (Stochastic process algebra simulation) 
A set of security properties 
A set of security requirement specifications  
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difficult to develop and maintain a perfectly secure system. Consequently, it is unrealistic to require that the system 
have a high level of satisfactions in every security property.  This is particularly true for a low-cost, distributed 
ubiquitous system whose components have limited computation and storage capabilities. Therefore, the system 
administrators need to determine whether the set of proposed security requirements for a system will guarantee that 
the system meets users’ security criteria and in the mean time with an acceptable level of implementation costs.  
There are two general steps in security property identification: threat modeling and security property specification.  
Details are discussed in the next two sub-sections. 
Threat Modeling 
Threat modeling is an important step towards security requirement specification of a system. It involves 
understanding the complexity of the system and identifying possible threats to the system.  Based on the identified 
threats, the system administrators can define the appropriate security requirements for the system in order to ensure 
that the system has the desired security features to withstand malicious attacks. With the corresponding security 
mechanisms put in place, the likelihood for the attackers to compromise the system can be greatly reduced.  
We use an RFID system as a running example throughout this paper to illustrate our ideas. We chose an RFID 
system because RFID is rapidly becoming an important part of enterprises and an RFID system is subject to various 
threats which can affect system security due to the high distribution nature and vulnerability of its components. 
(1) Characterizing critical system components and major access points 
The first step in threat modeling is to identify critical system components and major access points to this system. An 
important approach is to step through the system’s assets, reviewing a list of possible attacks for each asset 
(Westmark, 2006).  A set of threats that could possibly compromise the system and its critical components can be 
identified.  Then, the threat model is used as a basis to identify the security properties that the system must have 
given the threats. 
Figure 2 shows a typical structure of an RFID system. There are three major categories of components: tags, readers, 
and backend servers. A tag is a small device physically attached to an item with a unique identifier.  Each tag has an 
antenna for radio communication with one or more readers.  Compared with a tag, an RFID reader is a more 
powerful device which can identify the presence of a tag and read information stored in the tag (Glover & Bhatt, 
2006). The backend RFID server stores tag and reader authentication information as well as other data such as 
product descriptions and ownership.  Low- to mid-range RFID tags have limited computational capabilities and 
memory storage.   For those reasons, many standard security mechanisms (e.g. public key cryptography protocols) 








Figure 2: An RFID System Structure 
 
Formally, an RFID system can be represented as a tuple ∑ = {R, T, D, O1, O2}, where R represents a set of RFID 
readers; T represents a set of tags; D represents a set of backend servers; and O1 represents a set of relations between 
R and D, i.e., O1 ⊆ D × R.  An instance of O1, e.g., o = (r, d)∈ O1, where r∈R and d ∈ D, indicates that an RFID 
reader r is a legitimate reader authorized by a backend server d to retrieve further detailed tag information; and O2 
presents a set of relations between T and D, i.e., O2 ⊆ T × D.  An instance of O2, e.g., o’ = (t, d)∈ O2, where t∈ T 
and d ∈ D indicates that tag t is a legitimate tag in the system and there is a record for this tag as maintained by the 
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An access point is a communication connection point among the system components or with external systems.  
Access points are often used as entries for an adversary to penetrate into a system. In an RFID system, for example, 
tags and readers communicate through wireless channels, which are vulnerable to various attacks such as signal 
jamming as well as message interception, eavesdropping, interception, and replay. Therefore, the tag-reader wireless 
communication channel is one of the major access points for an attacker.  On the other hand, since readers and the 
backend servers typically communicate through secure channels (wired or wireless), they are less concerned.  
Furthermore, RFID tags have limited physical security.  For instance, an attacker can break into the tag memory by 
force or use fuming nitric acid to remove the resin coat of the tag, disconnect the microprocessor and attach on a 
single micro-probing needle to the data bus. Then by providing the address signal on the address bus, the secret 
memory content in that tag can be accessed. Other means of physical attacks include shaped charges, laser etching, 
and ion-probing.  So, physical contact is another major access point for the adversary to attack an RFID tag. 
(2) Identifying threats 
There are several approaches to identify security threats to a system and its critical components. In this paper, we 
use attack trees (Schneier, 1999) to identify the critical threats related to a critical system component (e.g., an RFID 
tag).  An attack tree provides a formal, methodical way of describing the security of the system based on varying 
attacks. In an attack tree, the root represents the threat corresponding to an asset (the attacker goal) and each node 
represents the attacker decision process.  Figure 3 shows an attack tree for an RFID tag.  It outlines the common 
approaches that an adversary can use to attack an RFID tag.  Those threats are discussed next and interested readers 
may refer to (Mitrokotsa, et al. 2009; Zuo, 2010) for a more complete list of attacks on RFID systems.   
Tag corruption: an attacker physically destroys a tag or uses special devices to read the tag memory and obtain 
identification related information (e.g., the tag secret key). 
Tag cloning: an attacker creates duplicated “authentic” RFID tags after capturing tag keys via either physical 
attacks of the tags or eavesdropping on the communications between the tag and a reader. 
Reply attack: an attacker makes the reader believe that the tag is in its close vicinity by surreptitiously 
forwarding the signal between the reader and an out-of-field tag. 
Replay attack: an attacker reuses a tag’s response to the reader in a previous session to impersonate the tag in 
the current session. 
Tag-reader communication channel jamming and interference: tag readings are interfered or intercepted 
through signal jamming by attackers using a powerful device. 
Tag-reader state desynchronization: An attack causes a tag to assume a state from its normal operation.  The 
tag becomes temporarily or permanently incapacitated. 
Impersonation attack: an attacker impersonates a tag without knowing the tag’s internal secrets. The attacker 





Figure 3: Attack Tree for RFID tag 
 
Similarly, threats can be identified for other important components and major entry points of an RFID system. For 
instance, the major threats to an RFID reader include impersonation, eavesdropping, relay attacks, spoofing, and 
passive/ active interference of tag-reader communications. The major threats to an RFID backend server include 
denial-of-service attacks, buffer overflow attacks, and malicious code injections. Due to page limitation, we will not 
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attacks are much harder to mount as compared with the attacks on RFID tags. Since RFID readers and the backend 
server are much more powerful devices, we assume that the readers and the backend server are relatively secure. 
Our focus is on the low-cost RFID tags with limited computational capacities and storage space.  RFID tags are the 
most vulnerable components of an RFID system. 
Specifying Security Properties Based on the Identified Threats 
After the major threats are identified, the corresponding security properties that the system and its critical 
components must have in order to eliminate or mitigate those security threats can be specified. Identifying the 
important security properties is essentially a mapping between the security threats and the set of security features 
that the system must have to withstand those threats.  We develop a security property mapping graph (similar to the 
survivability mapping graph presented by Zuo (Zuo, et al. 2009)) as a formal model to relate the security goals to a 
set of security properties of an RFID tag based on the threats identified in the subsection “Threat Modeling”.  
Conceptually, a security property mapping graph is a directed graph G = {V, E}, where V represents a set of vertices 
and E represents a set of directed edges. Each vertex in V represents one of the three types of nodes: (1) security 
goal or sub-goal node, denoted by an oval, representing a security objective to achieve; (2) threat node, denoted by 
an rectangle, representing a threat to the security goal or sub-goals; and (3) security property node, denoted by an 
wrapped rectangle, representing a security characteristic of the system to overcome the threat and achieve the 
desired security goals. These three types of vertices appear alternatively along a path in G from the root to a leaf (in 
the reverse edge direction).   The goal node must be at the root, followed by an optional sub-goal node, followed by 
















Figure 4: RFID Security Property Mapping Graph 
Each edge e ∈ E in a security property mapping graph G represents a relationship between the two connected nodes. 
The relationship can be a positive contribution represented by the “+” symbol or an inverse (or negative) 
contribution represented by the “–” symbol.  Positive contribution increases the chance of meeting a goal and 
inverse contribution decreases it.  For instance, suppose that the main security goal for an RFID tag is to ensure that 
the RFID system can provide trustworthy, timely, and reliable information about the tagged items to support higher-
level applications.  We can refine this goal to three sub-goals: RFID data confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
The three sub-goals positively contribute to the main goal.  So, the edge from each of the sub-goal node to the main 
goal node should be marked as “+”. On the other hand, a threat such as a denial-of-service attack on an RFID tag 
(through its communications with the reader, for example) can negatively contribute to the sub-goal of data 
availability since this attack could cause RFID data to be unavailable and consequently inversely affects information 
availability.  Therefore, the edge from the threat node “denial-of-service-attack” to the sub-goal node “RFID data 
availability” should be marked as “–”.  After the threats are specified, appropriate security properties can be 
identified so that, if the system has the security features in terms of the identified security properties, the system can 
have the ability to resist those threats.  Since the security properties represent counter-attack security requirements, 
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We give the security property mapping graph for an RFID tag in Figure 4.  As we can see from the figure, after the 
main security goal and sub-goals as shown above are specified, a set of potential threats that may hinder the main 
security goals or the sub-goals are outlined.  The possible threats that could affect RFID data confidentiality include 
eavesdropping and interception of messages transferred between an RFID tag and a reader, physically corruption of 
a tag, cloning of a tag, and impersonation attack (e.g., a fake reader attempts to fool a tag for sensitive data).  Other 
threats to a tag are shown in the figure, which aim at compromising data integrity and availability.  After the threat 
specification, a set of survivability properties are specified for each threat which, if satisfied, can effectively thwart 
the corresponding attacks.   For example, for the threat “physical corruption of a tag”, the security property “RFID 
tag physical tamper resistance” is specified – if an RFID tag has a strong tamper resistance property, it negatively 
contributes to threat of physically corrupting tags and thus positively contributes to the security sub-goals “RFID 
data integrity” and “RFID data confidentiality”.  We summarize the security properties for an RFID tag in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Security Properties of an RFID Tag 
 
Security Requirement Quantification 
In this section, we discuss security requirement quantification – the second phase of our framework. This phase 
focuses on quantitatively specifying the security requirements (called a security requirement specification) for a 
ubiquitous system.  A security requirement specification is defined in terms of a set of security properties of the 
system as shown below.  It is to ensure that the system has the required level of security. We use the term security 
level to represent the ability of a system to withstand malicious attacks and provide secure services to users.   
The process of security property identification as shown in the above qualitative analysis identifies a set of security 
properties {sp1, sp2, …, spn} for a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system.  A security requirement specification, 
denoted as SRSi, represents the users’ security requirements for the system in terms of those security properties. It is 
represented by a set of values to the identified security properties.  For example, Table 1 shows a set of security 
properties of an RFID tag {“Tamper resistance”, “Secure communications”, “Robustness/fault tolerance”, 
“Authentication and authorization ability”}.  The security requirement specification SRSi may be determined as 
{“tamper resistance” = high, “Secure communications” = medium, “Robustness/fault tolerance” = capable, 
“Authentication and authorization”=high}. Since cost is an important factor to consider in security analysis, we also 
include a cost factor for each security requirement, which indicates the resources needed to implement the security 
mechanisms in order to meet the particular security requirement.  Formally, a security requirement specification 
SRSi is represented as a tuple in the following format. 
Φ ={(sp1 = ai,1, C(ai,1)), (sp2 = ai,2, C(ai,2)), …, (spn = ai,n, C(ai,n))} 
where ai,1, ai,2, …, ai,n represent the set of values assigned to the corresponding set of security properties {sp1, sp2, …, 
spn} based on SRSi; and C(ai,1), C(ai,2), …, C(ai,n) represent the costs associated with the security requirements sp1 = 
ai,1, sp2 = ai,2, …, spn = ai,n, respectively. We also define a cost function for the security requirement specification 








)( , . 
Tamper resistance The tag’s ability to resist malicious attacks such as a physical break-in the tag, access control over 
sensitive data stored in the tag, anti-cloning, and anti-reverse engineering. 
Tag-reader Secure 
communications 
The communications between a tag and a reader should be secure against various wireless attacks. For 
instance, all the sensitive data should be appropriately encrypted using cryptographic protocols suitable 
for low-cost RFID tags. 
Tag Robustness/fault 
tolerance 
The tag’s ability to provide a reasonable level of robustness in critical services and fault tolerance.  
Those include basic damage masking mechanisms and prompt recovery from tag-reader state 




The tag’s ability to identify legitimate readers and only allow authorized entities to access sensitive 
data stored in the tag. This ability is represented by appropriately deployed anti-spoofing mechanisms, 
distance-bound authentication, and multi-factor authentications. 
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Incorporating cost into security requirement analysis is important for ubiquitous systems.  Some security 
requirements may be very costly to improve, while others may be relatively inexpensive.  For a low-cost, distributed 
ubiquitous system with a set of components distributed in a large scope with a high level of mobility, it may be very 
costly to implement advanced security functions. Since a ubiquitous device typically has limited physical resources 
(e.g., computation, communication, and storage) which can be devoted to security functions, system administrators 
may not be able to freely refine the security properties and choose the corresponding mechanisms to meet a security 
requirement.  For instance, currently it is still not realistic to implement standard cryptographic mechanisms (e.g., 
public-key algorithms) in low-cost RFID tags as limitations in area and power are quite severe in those devices.  
Rather, for low-cost RFID tags, several efficient implementations of hash functions are available. For instance, non-
linear feedback shift registers can be used to build a low-cost hash function.  Another alternative is to implement 
low-cost hash functions for a block size of 64 bits (Yuksel, 2004).  Regarding pseudorandom functions, a variety of 
well-known and validated constructions are established.  As discussed by Burmester (Burmester, et al., 2007), it is 
possible to build a pseudorandom function that makes a call to a pseudorandom generator (PRG) per bit of input 
processed.  In turn, a very efficient PRG implementation can be achieved using linear feedback shift registers. This 
results in a small number of bit operations per input and output bit. In addition, block ciphers can be used to 
implement pseudorandom functions through standard constructions.  Therefore, the costs to implement those 
functions are relatively low and suitable for RFID tags.  In general, the cost to implement a security mechanism in a 
system is domain dependent and there is no general formula which can be applied in all the cases.  In this paper we 
focus on security requirement quantifications and will leave the cost issues to our future work. 
A security requirement specification SRSi specifies the guidelines and security requirements for a system so that a 
set of security actions can be taken and the corresponding security mechanisms can be deployed in order for the 
system to achieve a desired level of security L.  The problem statement of the security requirement quantification is 
specified as “Given a security requirement specification SRSi with an acceptable level of implementation cost CSRSi, 
can the security features of the ubiquitous system based on SRSi ensure that the system has a desired level of security 
and thus meet the users’ security criteria?”  
Two consecutive steps are specified for security requirement quantification: (1) analyzing the cause-effect 
relationships between the specified security requirement specification for a critical system component and the rate at 
which the component could be compromised given a certain level of adversary capability; and (2) measuring the 
security level of the system as a whole given the compromise rate of the critical components and the system 
recovery capability.  The two steps will be discussed in the next two subsections. The output of the first step is used 
as input to the second step. 
Determining the Compromise Rate of a Critical System Component 
We apply a probabilistic model to study how the security features of a critical system component determine the rate 
at which the component could be compromised by an adversary.  A compromise rate represents how fast a system 
component could be possibly attacked and damaged.  It is measured as the number of the components in a category 
that can be compromised by an adversary per unit of time. We perceive that the compromise of a system component 
is dependent on several security features of that component in such a way that relationships exist between those 
security features and the compromise rate.  We represent such probabilistic relationships using a Bayesian network.  
Bayesian network is a very useful tool to represent evidence and cause-effect relationships and to predict 
probabilistic unknown values of variables of interest.  In the following discussion, we show how the compromise 
rate of an RFID tag is probabilistically determined by the tag’s security characteristics as specified by a security 
requirement specification. 
(1) The Bayesian security analysis network 
In this section, we present our Bayesian security analysis network model.  A Bayesian network consists of a 
structure and a set of parameters.  The structure is composed of nodes representing domain variables and edges 
connecting these nodes.  The Bayesian network structure encodes the probabilistic dependencies in the data – the 
presence of an edge between two variables means that there exists a direct dependency between them.  Although the 
structure of a Bayesian network can be learned from data, it may be less expensive to incorporate domain knowledge 
and apply heuristic rules to determine the Bayesian network.  In our framework, the qualitative analysis presented 
earlier has already identified important security properties of a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system and those 
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parameters have a great impact on the security status of a system component. Therefore, we apply the results of the 
qualitative analysis and incorporate domain heuristic rules to determine the Bayesian network structure. The detailed 
procedure consists of three steps as shown below. 
(a). Determine the important domain variables.  The goal of our Bayesian security analysis network is to 
represent how the security features of a component of a ubiquitous system probabilistically determine the security 
status of the component (represented as the compromise rate of the component) given a level of adversary 
capability.  The qualitative analysis has already identified important security properties (see Table 1). Those domain 
variables will be used as the nodes of the Bayesian security analysis network.  In addition, since the adversary 
capability has a great impact on the security status of a component, we also include such a variable in the Bayesian 
network. 
(b). Identify the cause-effect relationships (represented as parent-children relationships in a Bayesian 
network) between the domain variables.  Heuristic rules allow the incorporation of user knowledge through the prior 
probabilistic and relative strength over the associations between the variables.  For example, system administrators 
may determine that a set of security features of an RFID component determine the security baseline of the 
component.   Furthermore, the component’s security baseline and its robustness and fault tolerance determine the 
component’s compromise probability (e.g., highly possible, possible, low possible, and unlikely) given an 
adversary’s capability to launch attacks.  Therefore, there are strong cause-effect relationships between the security 
properties of the component and its security baseline.  In turn, the level of the component’s security baseline is an 
important factor in determining the compromise rate of the component under an attack.  The encoding of the 
dependency between those variables provides the basic structure of the Bayesian network. 
(c). Direction of the edge by following the oriental rules.  The fundamental oriental rule is that a parent 
node precedes a child node.  The cause-effect relationships identified in step (c) then determine a set of directed 
edges from the nodes that represent the “cause” side of the factors to the nodes that represent the “effect” side of the 
factors.  
Following the above procedure, we developed a Bayesian security analysis network, where each node of a Bayesian 
network represents a state, and a cause-effect relationship between two nodes is denoted by an arrow, called an edge.  
An instance of the Bayesian network corresponds to a security requirement specification.  For example, the instance 
of the Bayesian network corresponding to the security specification SRSi is shown in Figure 5, where SRSi = {“RFID 
tag tamper resistance” = “Very resistant”; “Tag-reader secure communication level” = “Medium”; “Tag 
authentication/authorization ability = “High”; “Tag robustness/fault tolerance”= “Capable”} given a high level of 
adversary capability.  In the next few sub-sections, we discuss the major components of the Bayesian network. 
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Figure 5: An Instance of the Bayesian Security Analysis Network 
Nodes 
As we discussed earlier, a node in a Bayesian network represents a domain variable in the situation being modeled. 
Each node is represented graphically by a labeled rectangle.  A node can take different values, each of which is 
referred to as a state of the node. A nature node models the nature or reality about one aspect of the system.  Based 
on the domain variables identified in the first phase of the framework, our Bayesian security analysis network has 
seven nature nodes (as explained in Table 2). 
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Table 2: The Bayesian Network Nodes 
Bayesian 
Network Node 
Semantic Meanings Domain Values 
Tamper resistance 
(TR) 
This node represents a security property of an RFID tag - the degree that the tag 
is resistant to physical corruption, tag cloning, tag disabling, malicious 
modification, and other physical attacks. 
Very resistant, 





Secure communication channels between the tags and readers are critical since 
various attacks (e.g., jamming, interference, channel hijacking, message 
interception and replay) can be mounted. This node is used to represent the 
security property of an RFID in terms of the security characteristics in terms of 
its communications with a reader. 




This node represents an RFID tag’s ability to authenticate legitimate readers 
and allow only authorized parties to access tag data. Virtually, every tag has at 
least some secret shared with a legitimate reader. However, the 
authentication/authorization ability varies from tag to tag. 
High, medium, or low. 
Security Baseline 
(SB) 
The combined effect of RFID tag tamper resistance, authentication & 
authorization ability, and the degree of secure communications with a reader 
determines the level of security baseline of the tag. This node represents such a 
security baseline. 




This node represents an adversary’s ability to compromise an RFID tag.  High, medium, or low. 
Robustness/fault 
tolerance (RFT) 
This node represents an RFID tag’s basic ability for function/service robustness 
and fault tolerance functions as well as damage masking. For instance, some 
RFID tags are programmed to resynchronize with the readers in case that the 
adversary desynchronizes their communications and tag-reader state. 
Capable or incapable. 
Tag Compromise 
Rate 
Given the values of the three nodes: “security baseline”, “adversary capability” 
and “robustness/fault tolerance”, the rate at which an RFID tag could be 
compromised by the adversary is presented by this node. We use “negligible” 
(e.g., 0.005) to represent the case that the tag is unlikely to be compromised. 
High rate (0.8), 
average rate (0.5), low 




An edge of a Bayesian network represents a cause-effect relationship between two nodes. It is represented 
graphically by an arrow between the two nodes and the direction of the arrow indicates the logical causality (see 
Figure 5). The intuitive meaning of an edge drawn from node A to node B is that A has a direct influence on B.  The 
conditional probability table (CPT) associated with a node defines quantitatively how the node (called the child 
node) is influenced by others (called the parent nodes).  In a relationship, the child node is conditionally dependent 
upon their parent nodes. For instance, as shown in Figure 5, the three parent nodes “Tamper resistance”, “Secure 
communications” and “Reliable authentication and authorization” jointly influence the child node “Security 
baseline” of an RFID tag. 
Conditional Probability Tables 
In a Bayesian network, the relationship between two nodes (events) A and B is defined as a conditional probability, 
P(A | B), which represents the probability of A conditional on a given outcome of B. The conditional probability is 
calculated using Bayes’ Theorem (Jensen, 2002) as shown in Formula (1), where P(B|A) is the conditional 
probability of B given A, and P(B) and P(A) are the unconditional probabilities of B and A, respectively. The 
probabilistic dependency is maintained by CPT, which shows all possible outcomes of a given node and the 
conditional probability corresponding to each outcome given all its parent nodes. 




APABP      (1) 
To present the conditional probabilities of parent nodes on a child node, every intermediate and leaf node has a CPT 
associated with it.  For every possible combination of the parent states, there is a row in the child node’s CPT that 
describes the possible state that the child node should be. Nodes with no parents also have CPTs but they only 
consist of the probabilities for each state of that node. In our model, the CPT tables are generated through a 
Bayesian learning process given a set of training data.  Due to page limitation, we will not discuss this issue here. 
(2) Determining the compromise rate of critical system components 
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We implemented the Bayesian security analysis network using Netica (http://www.norsys.com). The Bayesian 
network takes as input a set of values for the security properties (e.g., a high level of RFID tag tamper resistance 
ability, a medium level of tag authentication and authorization ability with other system components, and capability 
of tag robustness/fault tolerance). For a given level of adversary ability, the network probabilistically determines the 
rate that the tag could be compromised given the input. That information is important for the system administrator to 
determine if the current security features corresponding to a security requirement specification for an RFID tag can 
guarantee that the system meets users’ security expectations. 
Given all the possible combination of different values of each input node in our Bayesian security analysis network 
(see Figure 5), there are in total 3*3*3**2*3 = 162 possible results for the goal node “Tag Compromise Rate”.  We 
conducted various simulations but only show a few sample results here as summarized in Table 3. Each entry in 
table corresponds to a testing case, which lists the value for each node of the Bayesian network.  Essentially, a 
testing case corresponds to a security requirement specification proposed for an RFID tag. For instance, the first 
entry represents the case specifying the security requirements for an RFID tag as follows: (a) it is required to be very 
tamper resistant (to physical attacks), (b) the communications between tag and the reader are highly secure 
according to RFID standards, (c) the tag has a relative high level of authentication and authorization ability (relative 
to general low-cost devices), and (d) the tag has a reasonably high level robustness/fault tolerance.  In this case, 
given the adversary with a high level of capability to attack the RFID system, the Bayesian network determines that 
the probabilities of the compromise rate of the tag being high (i.e., 0.8), medium (0.5), low (0.1) and negligible 
(0.005) are 1.02%, 14.1%, 54.7%, and 30.2%, respectively.  Due to probabilistic nature of the Bayesian network, a 
set of values of compromise rate with different probabilities are returned.  For each case, the mean compromise rate 
of the tag, denoted as c, is calculated as the weighted average of those compromise rates with the corresponding 
occurrence probabilities. The last column of Table 4 shows the mean compromise rate for each testing case. 
As the first step of security requirement quantification, the Bayesian security analysis network model determines the 
compromise rate of an RFID tag.  However, for a ubiquitous system (e.g., an RFID system) with a large number of  
tags distributed components, damages to some components (e.g., RFID tags) do not necessarily mean that the entire 
system is not useful.  Due to the system’s self-recovery and fault tolerance abilities, even if some components are 
compromised, the system may still be trusted to provide an acceptable level of services.  In our second step of 
security requirement quantification, we will measure the security level of a ubiquitous system as a whole given two 
opposite factors – the compromise rate of individual components and the recovery rate of damaged components. 
 
 Table 3: The Bayesian Security Analysis Testing Case 
 Measuring the Security Level of a Ubiquitous System 
In this section, we study the security level of a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system (e.g., an RFID system) given 
the compromise rate of the system components (e.g., RFID tags) and the system’s recovery rate.  As an important 
security requirement, virtually all the ubiquitous systems have some intrusion detection and damage recovery 
mechanisms put in place.  Therefore, when an intrusion is detected and some components are damaged, the system 
can repair and restore the compromised components to their pre-attack clean states.  Component recovery can take 
various forms.  For instance, an RFID tag can be reprogrammed when it is compromised or resynchronized with a 
 

























High High Capable High 1.02 14.1 54.7 30.2 0.104 
Resistant High Medium Capable High 1.4 16.2 51.3 31 0.109 
Very 
resistant 
Medium Medium Capable High 11.8 27.8 32.7 24.2 0.201 
Resistant Medium High Capable High 16.5 17.7 48.1 32.5 0.231 
Low 
resistant 
Medium Low Capable Medium 9.49 18.9 37.3 32.5 0.167 
Resistant High High Capable Low 0 1.5 6.2 92.3 0.028 
Resistant Medium Medium Incapable Low 0 1.85 28.1 70 0.047 
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legitimate reader if it is out of state with the reader due to malicious attacks or communication failures.  The security 
level of a ubiquitous system, denoted as L, is determined by two factors: how fast the critical system components 
could be possibly compromised (i.e., the compromise rate) and how fast the compromised components can be 
successfully recovered (i.e., the recovery rate).  We use Formula (2) to represent a generic method to calculate the 
security level of a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system, where nh represents the number of healthy 
(uncompromised) components and nt represents the total number of components in the system.  The security level is 
calculated as the percentage of healthy components out of the total number of components in the system. 




n             (2) 
Questions remain regarding how to determine the number of compromised components given the compromise rate 
of a critical system component and the system recovery ability. Since a compromise rate probabilistically represents 
how fast a component could be compromised, there is a need for the model to reflect the uncertainty nature of the 
attack and system recovery.  In this paper, we have chosen the stochastic process algebra to simulate the interactions 
between compromise and recovery activities on RFID tags. The system status at each state can be determined 
probabilistically. The corresponding security level of the system as a whole can be determined.  Research 
(McDemott, 2005; Zuo, 2010) has already shown that stochastic process algebra is a useful model to simulate 
attacks and recovery.  Stochastic process algebras introduce timing and probability qualifications to pure process 
algebras. The timed and probabilistic process algebras are well suitable for modeling the concurrent, dynamic 
interactions between the adversary and a system such as ubiquitous computing with uncertainty (such as the random 
time for a component to be compromised).  The simulation model will determine the probability of each system 
status, i.e., the number of components compromised given a certain compromise rate and a system recovery rate. 



















Figure 6: PEPA Model of RFID Attack and                          Figure 7: Security Level of an RFID System 
                 System Recovery 
                                            
We model the stochastic process algebra process using the Performance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA) tool 
(Hillston, 1994).  PEPA is a stochastic description technique. Its models are constructed by the composition of 
components (processes) which perform individual activities or cooperate on shared ones. The basic operators of 
PEPA model include: (1) activity prefix (α, rα).P: prefixing the activity α to process P to describe its behavior.  
Activity α has a duration that is negatively exponentially distributed with a variable rα.  Thus, the process algebra 
can be used to represent a Markov process. The basic elements of PEPA, i.e., the components and activities, 
correspond to the states and transitions of the underlying Continuous Time Markov Chain; (2) process choice P+Q: 
the behavior of the system could be either P or Q depending on some random variables. If one process is chosen, the 
activities of that process will be complete before the other; and (3) a cooperation operator P  Q: a cooperating 
process synchronizes on the activities in the cooperation set L. The activities in L will occur together in processes P 
and Q but with the duration of the slower activity. 
In our simulation, the attacks on RFID tags are represented as stochastic faults whose occurrence is predicted by the 
tag compromise rate as we discussed in earlier. The RFID system is modeled as interactions between the adversary 
process and the RFID tags.  The attack-recovery process is executed for an extended time so that the stochastic 
   S0 ≡ (compromise, T). S1 
…   … 
Si ≡ (compromise, T). Si+1 + (recover, r). Si-1  
…  … 
Sn ≡ (recover, r).Sn-1 
 
Adversary ≡ (compromise, c).Adversary 
RFID ≡  S0 Adversary       (L = {compromise}) 
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model representing the interactions of the attack and the RFID system reaches a set of steady states.  Each state (call 
RFID system status in the following discussions to avoid confusion with other similar terms) represents an 
equilibrium point, i.e., the number of compromised tags and the number of recovered tags are equal. Due to the 
random nature of the stochastic algebra process, the RFID system has a probabilistic occurrence at every status in 
the state space.  For instance, for an RFID system with n tags, there are (n+1) possible status S0, S1, …, Sn, which 
represent that 0, 1, …, n tags are compromised, respectively. Each status Si (0 ≤ i ≤ n) has an occurrence possibility 
pi.  Given the stochastic description of the RFID system under attack, the security level of the system as calculated 
using Formula (2) can be refined to incorporate the probabilistic nature of different system status to reflect the 
uncertainty of attack and recovery effects. The refined security level calculation is shown in Formula (3). Our PEPA 
simulation model will determine the possibilities of different system status given the tag compromise rate c and 
system recovery rate r. 
The PEPA model representing attacks on the tags and system recovery is shown in Figure 6.  For the sake of 
simplicity, we considered a small RFID system comprising of only 10 tags. However, it is straightforward to 
generalize to larger systems. The model has two components: tags and attacker.  The process Si represents the status 
of the RFID system where i tags have been compromised.  Each Si process has two possible behaviors: (1) moving 
to next status Si+1, indicating that one more tag is compromised; and (2) going back to the previous status Si-1, 
indicating that one compromised tag is recovered. The behaviors of the adversary are modeled by the PEPA process 
Adversary with a compromise rate c.  The activities of the model are (1) compromise, representing the corruption of 
a tag. This activity has an unspecified rate denoted by the symbol T.  This rate will be determined by the tag 
compromise rate c when the two processes Attacker and Si are synchronized; and (2) recovery, representing the 
recovery of a compromised tag with a recovery rate r.  The recovery rate of a tag by the RFID system is determined 
by the system recovery and repair ability. We assume this rate is known. The RFID system is modeled using the 
PEPA cooperation operator S0  Adversary (where L = {compromise}) to represent the interactions of the 
adversary and the tags via synchronized participation in the event compromise. 
The PEPA model has been solved using the PEPA Eclipse Plug-in software.  Given the occurrence probability of 
each RFID system status, we can apply Formula (3) to calculate the security level of an RFID system.  As an 
example, for a given recovery rate
2
 (e.g., r=0.3), if the (mean) compromise rate of a tag is 0.104 and the adversary 
capability is determined as high, then the security level of the RFID system is 94.69%.  This indicates that about 
94.69% of total number of tags are healthy (i.e., not compromised by the adversary) given the two opposite effects 
of malicious attacks and system recovery.  
Since a system recovery rate has a significant impact on the security level of a ubiquitous system, we executed our 
PEPA simulation model and calculated the different security levels of an RFID system with various combinations of 
tag compromise rates and system recovery rates.  Figure 7 shows the results, where we can see that a higher 
compromise rate or a low recovery rate results in a lower security level of the RFID system.  Furthermore, we can 
observe that the security level under a smaller recovery rate (e.g., r=0.2) is more sensitive to any small change in 
compromise rate.  For instance, given a lower recovery rate, the system’s security level decreases more significantly 
for the same increase of the compromise rate as compared with the situation with a higher recovery rate.  This has an 
important implication to the system administrator in determining security budgets. Any investment to improve 
recovery rate is always beneficial because it improves the system security level to a greater extent. 
Putting Everything Together 
We now summarize the major components of our framework and show how to integrate them to determine whether 
a specific security requirement specification proposed for a low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system can guarantee 
that the system has a required level of security.  The flowchart to apply our framework is shown in Figure 8 and the 
four major steps are explained next. 
Step 1: The process of security property identification as shown in the qualitative analysis of our framework 
determines a set of security properties {sp1, sp2, …, spn}.  A security requirement specification represents user’s 
                                                          
2
 We assume that the system recovery rate is available since it depends on the system’s inherent features determined by its design 
and implementation, which are supposed to be known to the system administrators. 
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security requirements for the system and specifies the values for those security properties.  Since there could be a set 
of plans for different security requirement specifications, SRS1, SRS2, …, SRSi, …, SRSn, we assume that the system 
administrator chooses a security requirement specification SRSi with an acceptable level of security cost (e.g., the 
one with the minimum cost) and see if the security level of the system based on SRSi can meet the users’ security 
criteria.  Suppose that for the set of n security properties identified, the corresponding n values for SRSi are 
represented in a set {ai,1, a i,2, …, a i,n}.  If those security requirements are satisfied, then the system has the set of 
desired security features. 
Step 2: By applying the Bayesian security analysis network model, the security features of the system (as 
determined in step 1) determines a compromise rate of the critical components of the ubiquitous system given an 
adversary capability.  The compromise rate has a set of values {c1, …, cm} with their corresponding probabilities of 
occurrence {pc1, pc2, …, pc}.  A mean compromise rate of the tag, represented as c, is calculated using Formula (4). 







*     (4) 
Step 3: Given the (mean) tag compromise rate c and a system recovery rate r, the PEPA model generates the 
possibilities of the system in different status S0, S1, …, Sn.  As discussed earlier, each status Si (0≤i≤n) represents the 
system state where i out of n components have been compromised.  
Step 4: The security level of the ubiquitous system is calculated using Formula (3). If a pre-defined threshold, 
denoted as L*, has been set up to represent the user’s minimum required security criteria for the system, then the 
system administrator can decide if the proposed security requirement specification in step 1 can ensure that the 
system satisfies the user’s security expectations.  As shown in Figure 8, if the calculated security level L given the 
specific security requirements is greater than the user’s required security level L*, i.e., L ≥ L*, then the security 
requirement specification (as represented as the values of the security properties, {a1, a2, …, an}) can be accepted. 
As a result, the security requirements can be enforced in the system design, development, or security evaluation 
processes since they can guarantee that the user’s required security level can be satisfied. Otherwise, the security 
properties must be refined towards higher criterion or another security requirement specification SRSj (i ≠ j) should 
be selected so that a higher level of security can be resulted (by applying the above steps 2-4). 
 
To illustrate, we have conducted a set of simulations by following the flow chart to quantify the security level of a 
ubiquitous system under different sets of security requirement specifications. The results are summarized in Table 4 
(we only show the results given the recovery rate r=0.3).  Each entry in the table represents a case with the set of 
identified security properties for a ubiquitous system, the values of those security properties given a particular 
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system (i.e., a security requirement specification for the ubiquitous system), the mean compromise rate of a system 
component, the adversary capability, the tag recovery rate, and finally the security level of the ubiquitous system.  
For instance, as shown in the first entry of the table, given a security requirement specification for a system 
component (e.g., an RFID tag), i.e., {high levels of tamper resistance, secure communications, 
authentication/authorization ability, and robustness/fault tolerance}, and a high level of adversary capability, the 
mean component compromise rate is calculated as 0.104. The security level of the system is calculated as 94.69% 
(given the system recovery rate r= 0.3). This security level is above the pre-defined threshold (L*=90%), and 
therefore the proposed security requirement specification can be accepted.  Other entries in Table 4 can be 
interpreted in the same way. 
Table 4: Security Requirement Quantification Cases 
 
Our framework can assist system administrators in answering various what-if questions. For instance, if we change 
some security requirements for the critical components of a system, can we still ensure that the system satisfies 
users’ security criteria? Can we make some aspects of the system security features stronger and in the mean time 
relax some other requirements for the system while the system can still maintain a satisfied level of security? What 
will be the security requirements given a different adversary capability, after the threat model shows additional 
evidence about the possibility of the attacks? The answers to those questions can make the system design and 
security specification more flexible. In some applications, certain aspects of the system are hard to implement 
towards a higher level of security (e.g., it is difficult to require a higher level of fault tolerance for low-cost 
ubiquitous devices such as RFID tags due to their computational and memory constraints). Our framework allows 
the system designers and administrators to empower other aspects of a system to “compensate” for some relative 
weak areas that may be technically challenging to implement. 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of system engineering, security requirement analysis is the important first step in security 
specification and compliance evaluation.  In this paper, we present a framework for security requirement analysis for 
the class of low-cost, distributed ubiquitous system with three major components: identification of essential security 
properties, determination of the compromise rates of critical system components, and measurement of security level 
of the system given a security requirement specification.  Our framework is suitable for such a ubiquitous system 
with a large number of small, inexpensive, networked processing devices (e.g., RFID tags, wireless sensors, and Ad 
hoc notes).  We used an RFID system as a running example throughout the paper to illustrate our ideas. 
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High High Capable High 0.104 0.3 94.69% 90% Yes 
Resistant High Medium Capable High 0.109 0.3 94.29% 90% Yes 
Very 
resistant 
Medium Medium Capable High 0.201 0.3 
81.06% 
90% No 
Resistant Medium High Capable High 0.231 0.3 73.10% 90% No 
Low 
resistant 
Medium Low Capable Medium 0.167 0.3 
87.62% 
90% No 
Resistant High High Capable Low 0.028 0.3 98.14% 90% Yes 
Resistant Medium Medium Incapable Low 0.047 0.3 94.29% 90% Yes 
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